com.fronesislabs/dcl-trust-oracle · v2.3.1 · crypto-web3
DCL Trust Oracle — AI/LLM Output Audit (x402 MCP) is healthy: it completed an MCP handshake in 999 ms and exposes 18 tools.
AI/LLM agent output audit MCP: policy eval, tamper-evident chain, AI safety, x402 USDC on Base.
Endpoint: https://mcp.fronesislabs.com/mcp (streamable-http)
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| Users (last 30 days) | 0 |
| Handshake | Healthy |
| Auth needed | None |
| Tool count | 18 |
| Latency | 999 ms |
| Last checked (UTC) | 2026-10-17T04:00:42.105Z |
| Checked (UTC) | Status | Latency | Error |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-17T04:00:42.105Z | Healthy | 999 | |
| 2026-10-15T21:05:11.862Z | Healthy | 1457 | |
| 2026-10-14T19:30:38.017Z | Healthy | 3310 |
dcl_evaluate_fast | FAST Pre-Action Audit ($0.01). Runs the response through the server's "default" policy: a substring check against 3 forbidden phrases ("ignore previous instructions", "jailbreak", "bypass safety") with a 0.7 minimum-confidence threshold. Each forbidden match found costs 0.4 confidence; if confidence |
dcl_evaluate_strict | STRICT Pre-Action Audit ($0.05). Runs the response against a broader, higher-bar "strict" policy: the union of all forbidden phrases from the default, anti-jailbreak, and safety policies (8 phrases total), with a 0.85 minimum-confidence threshold instead of the default policy's 0.7. Each matched phr |
dcl_evaluate_jailbreak | PRE-ACTION Instruction Adherence Check ($0.02). Runs the "anti_jailbreak" policy: a substring check against 6 forbidden phrases ("ignore previous instructions", "jailbreak", "bypass safety", "pretend you are", "act as if", "DAN") with a 0.8 minimum-confidence threshold — each match costs 0.4 confide |
dcl_evaluate_safety | PRE-ACTION Baseline Safety Check ($0.01). Runs the "safety" policy: flags 2 forbidden disclaimers ("I cannot be held responsible", "no guarantees") and additionally REQUIRES the substring "AI" to appear somewhere in the response — missing it costs 0.2 confidence even with no forbidden phrase present |
dcl_evaluate_quality | PRE-ACTION Content Quality & Drift Check ($0.03). Runs the "content_quality" policy: flags 12 absolutist or unverifiable-claim phrases (e.g. "guaranteed returns", "100% accurate", "studies show", "without a doubt") with a 0.85 minimum-confidence threshold — the highest bar of any single-policy tool. |
dcl_evaluate_secrets | POST-ACTION Secret & Credential Leak Scan ($0.02). Regex-based scan across 8 categories (API keys, cloud credentials, tokens/JWTs, private keys, DB URLs, connection strings, env assignments, webhook secrets, internal endpoints with auth). Any finding results in NO_COMMIT. |
dcl_evaluate_pii | POST-ACTION PII Detection Scan ($0.02). Regex-based scan across 8 personal-data categories, with a Luhn checksum on card numbers to reduce false positives. Any finding results in NO_COMMIT. |
dcl_evaluate_batch | PRE-ACTION Bulk Processing ($0.10). Evaluates a list of items in one call; each item is a dict shaped {"response": str, "policy"?: str}, where policy defaults to "default" if omitted and may be any built-in policy name (default, strict, anti_jailbreak, safety, content_quality). Each item gets its ow |
dcl_pipeline_start | SESSION Management ($0.05). Generates a new `pipeline_id` and returns session metadata (scope, expiry, initial drift_mode) for organizing a series of related checks under one identifier. Note: this call does not currently link the returned pipeline_id to later evaluate_* calls — there is no server-s |
dcl_audit_decode | POST-ACTION Basic Audit ($0.10). Retrieves a record from the tamper-evident chain by tx_hash. |
dcl_audit_decode_deep | POST-ACTION Deep Forensic Audit ($0.50). Extended output with drift_context and full chain integrity verification. |
dcl_evaluate_jailbreak_crypto | PRE-ACTION Crypto Jailbreak & Injection Detection ($0.02). Crypto-specialized instruction-override/jailbreak/injection screen: standard role-switch and instruction-override patterns, plus crypto-specific drain-wallet injection (e.g. "transfer all funds to...", fake "test transaction" requesting full |
dcl_evaluate_wallet | POST-ACTION Wallet Secret Guardian ($0.02). Scans for BIP-39 seed phrases (12 or 24 consecutive wordlist words), raw hex or WIF-format private keys, Ethereum/Bitcoin wallet addresses, and API keys/bearer tokens appearing near wallet/custody/signing terminology. Any finding results in NO_COMMIT — wal |
dcl_evaluate_trade | PRE-ACTION Trade Decision Verifier ($0.02). Screens trade-decision language for guaranteed-return claims, zero-risk/"can't lose" framing, and unqualified "buy/sell X now" directives — any match is NO_COMMIT. If no unsafe language is found, COMMIT additionally requires the word "risk" to appear anywh |
dcl_evaluate_mev | POST-ACTION MEV & Market-Abuse Compliance Screen ($0.03). Text-level screen (not a mempool/transaction analyzer) for front-running/sandwich-attack language, wash trading/layering/spoofing, KYC/AML red flags (mixers, structuring, obscuring fund origin), and pump-and-dump/rug-pull language. Any critic |
dcl_evaluate_signal | POST-ACTION Market Signal Fabrication Screen ($0.03). Pattern-based heuristic on the output text alone (no source price feed) — flags guaranteed-price-prediction language ("will definitely hit $X"), absolute-certainty claims ("100% certain", "cannot go down"), a fabricated-price flag when a specific |
dcl_evaluate_output_sanitizer | FINAL-GATE Output Sanitizer ($0.02). Post-processing checkpoint that strips secrets/credentials, PII, crypto material (seed phrases, private keys, wallet addresses), internal network details (private IPs, MAC addresses, .internal/.local/.corp hostnames), and unsafe shell/SQL/path-traversal fragments |
dcl_commit | FINAL-STEP Leibniz Layer Crypto Commit ($0.01). Writes a trading/agent decision to the append-only Leibniz Layer audit chain and returns a Merkle-proof-style receipt: `tx_hash` (proof of this specific commit), `chain_hash` (the previous commit's hash, linking this one into the chain), and `chain_dep |