com.tamingdns/mcp · v1.0.0 · communication
TamingDNS is healthy: it completed an MCP handshake in 992 ms and exposes 10 tools.
Check SPF, DKIM, DMARC, MX, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE and DNSSEC, and analyse email headers.
Endpoint: https://tamingdns.com/mcp (streamable-http)
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| Users (last 30 days) | 0 |
| Handshake | Healthy |
| Auth needed | None |
| Tool count | 10 |
| Latency | 992 ms |
| Last checked (UTC) | 2026-11-06T21:25:48.893Z |
| Checked (UTC) | Status | Latency | Error |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-06T21:25:48.893Z | Healthy | 992 |
check_spf | Check the SPF record for a domain. Returns the raw record, grade (A-F), the terminal `all` qualifier (resolved through redirect= chains), structured findings (NEAR_LOOKUP_LIMIT, LOOKUP_LIMIT_EXCEEDED, PLUS_ALL_DANGEROUS, PTR_MECHANISM_DEPRECATED, etc.), and an `analysis` block with the expanded incl |
check_dkim | Look up a DKIM public key at <selector>._domainkey.<domain> and validate it. Detects key revocation (empty p=), RSA key length (KEY_TOO_SHORT below 1024, KEY_WEAK below 2048), SHA-1 hash deprecation, and t=y test mode. For selector1/selector2 it also checks a Microsoft 365 CNAME target carries the t |
check_dmarc | Check the _dmarc record for a domain with DUAL discovery: the RFC 7489 §6.6.3 organisational-domain ladder (what major receivers enforce today — grade/verdict anchor to it) AND the RFC 9989 §4.10 DNS Tree Walk (8-query cap, psd=n/y stop rules, fewest-labels org selection) into analysis.discovery {le |
check_tls_rpt | Check the TLS-RPT (SMTP TLS Reporting, RFC 8460) record at _smtp._tls.<domain>. Strict §3 classification: the record must BEGIN with the case-sensitive v=TLSRPTv1 tag, more than one such record means receivers treat TLS-RPT as not implemented, and rua= is required. Validates every rua= destination s |
check_mta_sts | Check MTA-STS (RFC 8461) for a domain: the _mta-sts TXT record (strict §3.1 selection — case-sensitive leading v=STSv1, exactly one record, required 1-32 alphanumeric id), the policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt fetched WITHOUT following redirects (§3.3), strict §3.2 poli |
check_bimi | Check default._bimi.<domain>: parses the BIMI record, validates the SVG Tiny-PS logo, inspects the VMC chain (expiry, EKU, SCT, issuer-accepted, SAN match, logotype hash), and verifies the DMARC prerequisite (p=quarantine/reject at pct=100 with no sp=none — the RFC 7489 reading Gmail and Apple Mail |
check_dane | Check SMTP DANE / TLSA records for a domain (RFC 7672). Resolves the MX hosts (falls back to the apex when none), looks up the TLSA record at _25._tcp.<mx-host> over binary DoH, classifies each record (usage 0-3 / selector 0-1 / matching 0-2 per RFC 7671 §2.1), and confirms the answer carried the DN |
check_dnssec | Validate a domain's DNSSEC chain of trust. Pulls DS (at the parent), DNSKEY, and RRSIG over binary DoH, walks the chain zone-by-zone (root → TLD → domain) recomputing each DS digest against the published DNSKEYs (RFC 4034 §5.1.4), and cross-checks the AD bit across Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, and Ope |
check_mx | Inspect a domain's MX / mail-routing posture. Resolves the apex MX RRset (priority-sorted), and for each host the A/AAAA addresses, PTR + forward-confirmed reverse DNS (FCrDNS), DANE TLSA at _25._tcp.<host>, IP-literal (RFC 5321 §5) and CNAME (RFC 2181 §10.3) violations, and the mail provider. Detec |
analyze_email_headers | Analyse a pasted block of raw email headers for spoofing and phishing tells. Input is the raw headers (everything up to the first blank line — "Show original" / "View source"); the message body is not required. Returns structured findings + a phishing verdict (likely_phishing/verify_sender/minor_con |