dev.workers.mike-tusa.glyphguard/glyphguard · v0.1.0 · developer-tools
GlyphGuard is healthy: it completed an MCP handshake in 710 ms and exposes 3 tools.
Find hidden Unicode (zero-width, bidi, tag payloads), homoglyphs and lookalike names in text.
Endpoint: https://glyphguard.mike-tusa.workers.dev/mcp (streamable-http)
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| Users (last 30 days) | 0 |
| Handshake | Healthy |
| Auth needed | None |
| Tool count | 3 |
| Latency | 710 ms |
| Last checked (UTC) | 2026-10-22T10:45:13.975Z |
| Checked (UTC) | Status | Latency | Error |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-22T10:45:13.975Z | Healthy | 710 |
scan_text | Find invisible characters, bidi controls (Trojan Source), hidden Unicode tag payloads (decoded), variation-selector runs, control characters, unusual spaces, mixed-script words and lookalike letters. ZWJ/ZWNJ/VS16 in legitimate context (emoji sequences, Persian/Arabic joining, Indic virama) are repo |
clean_text | Return the text with invisible characters, bidi controls, tag characters and control characters removed and unusual spaces turned into normal spaces. By default ZWJ/ZWNJ/VS16 are kept inside emoji sequences, between letters of joining scripts (Arabic, Persian) and after an Indic virama (keep_joiners |
compare_names | Check whether a name, username, domain label or brand looks the same as any of up to 50 protected names (for example "pаypal" with a Cyrillic а vs "paypal"), using a UTS #39-style confusable skeleton (curated subset, case and accents ignored). Read-only. Same engine as GET /api/compare. |