io.github.jeannicolasdavid1979/verdictl402 · v0.2.2 · agents-and-memory
Verdict L402 is healthy: it completed an MCP handshake in 767 ms and exposes 4 tools.
Ask if an action is safe before your agent runs it: injection, shell, MCP installs. Free samples.
Endpoint: https://verdict.kechlab.com/mcp (streamable-http)
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| Users (last 30 days) | 0 |
| Handshake | Healthy |
| Auth needed | None |
| Tool count | 4 |
| Latency | 767 ms |
| Last checked (UTC) | 2026-10-20T16:11:08.466Z |
| Checked (UTC) | Status | Latency | Error |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-20T16:11:08.466Z | Healthy | 767 |
verdict_guard | Free sample. Before your agent reads untrusted text (web page, email, document, tool output), check it for prompt injection, data exfiltration requests, secrets and toxic content. Returns allow, review or block with scores and reasons. Use it on text you did not write. Do not use it to judge an acti |
verdict_command_gate | Free sample. Before a coding agent runs a shell command, ask whether to allow, review or block it: root deletion, download and run, privilege escalation, secret exfiltration. Pass the human intent when you know it. Not a sandbox: it reads the command, it does not run it. |
verdict_mcp_vet | Free sample. Before installing an MCP server, skill or tool: is its description poisoned (hidden orders to the agent, excessive permissions, look-alike names)? Returns allow, review or block with reasons. |
verdict_firewall | Free sample. Before an agent acts on untrusted content (pay, send, delete, click, reply), give the human goal, the content it read and the action it proposes. Returns allow, review or block: it catches actions that follow orders hidden in the content. |